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Promise and Contract: On the Limited Role 
of Social Ideas 
 
Abstract. The essay is devoted to the role of promise as a moral concept, and, more 
narrowly, the relationship of promise and offer in contract law. First, it considers the 
difference between “ordinary” promises and promises having a legal effect. Secondly, the 
analysis explores to what extent does promise generate obligation. Thereafter, the essay 
attempts to point to the concept of obligation that provides the best way to establish 
the moral force of contract. It reaches the conclusion that the relationship between 
promise as a moral category and facts treated as promise in law is almost accidental. Law is 
at least indifferent to factors that give rise to moral obligation based upon a promise. 
However, law (emancipated from the dictates of morals) served freedom better than 
legal norms formulated in morally coloured terms. 
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“Tonio Kröger … stood before the cold altar,  
full of regret and dismay, at the fact that  
faithfulness was impossible upon this earth.  
Then he shrugged his shoulders and went his way.”∗
 
 
 
Gyula Eörsi, in his principal work titled Comparative Civil (Private) Law: 
Law Types, Law Groups, the Roads of Legal Development [Összehasonlító 
polgári jog] by taking the role of law in society as a starting point, justifies 
a theory of legal development governed by practical needs. According to 
Eörsi, the “ultimately determining economic factors produce interests which 
unvariably have an influence on law through the transmission of ideas. 
Social ideas, as products of the mind, have a relative independence, but 
ideas which have an important bearing on society always have their roots 
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ultimately in economic factors.”1 He characterises the role of social ideas 
as “important but not basic”. 
 The following analysis is devoted to the role of promise as a moral 
concept and, more narrowly, the relationship of promise and offer in 
contract law. Does law enforce the morals of promise, or, instead, does it 
enforce contractual obligations on the basis of more practical considerations 
determined by economic factors? Shifts in the public perception of the 
binding force of promises seem to have an impact on the law of contracts. 
However, Gyula Eörsi is right even after a quarter of a century: although 
the social idea of promise might have a significant impact on the law of 
contracts, it still is of secondary importance compared to economic interests 
that shape (or abandon) the social idea itself. 
 The questions to follow are dictated by moderate outrage. It is disturbing 
that the given word is not respected, or, more precisely, that even this very 
proposition concerning the normative basis of expectation is disrespected. 
It is embarrassing when moral norms are violated, but it is bothersome 
when the moral norm is taken as non-existent. Those who keep their 
promises and especially those who hope that others will do the same are 
taken as queer fish in our days. True, the principle of “ein Mann, ein 
Wort” was professed by merchants and by otherwise rather unattractive 
military officers. Characters of long passed times: it is a recurring motive 
of Eörsi's book that the time of the Buddenbrooks is over. 
 No era is marked for decline. In the words of Shakespeare: “Then fate 
o'er-rules, that, one man holding troth, A million fail, confounding oath on 
oath.”2 Yet, the decline of respect for promises is an important indicator of the 
state of a society. “To breed an animal which is able to make promises—is 
that not precisely the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with 
regard to humankind? Is it not the real problem of humankind?”3—asked 
the great German philosopher. No, not Kant but ... Nietzsche. Nietzsche—
in surprising conformity with Kant—celebrates the success of man in the 
ability to promise, in the “will’s memory”, in “an active desire not let go, a 
desire to keep desiring what has been, on some occasion, desired”.4 The 

 
1
 Eörsi, Gy.: Comparative Civil (Private) Law: Law Types, Law Groups, the 
Roads of Legal Development. Budapest, 1979, 45–46. The Hungarian original of the work 
was published as Összehasonlító polgári jog: Jogtípusok, jogcsoportok és a jogfej-
l dés útja. Budapest, 1975. 
 
2
 Shakespeare, W.: A Midsummer-nights Tale; Act Three, Scene II.  
 
3
 Nietzsche, F.: On the Genealogy of Morality (ed.: Keith Ansell-Preason). 
Cambridge, 1994, 38 (emphasis original). 
 
4
 Nietzsche: op. cit. 39. 
 PROMISE AND CONTRACT: ON THE LIMITED ROLE OF SOCIAL IDEAS 59 
  
man of promise, learning to render himself predictable, is able to have the 
future at his disposal. The man of promise can live up to his own image of 
the future. By making himself predictable, he became “a sovereign individual, 
… like only to himself, having freed itself from the morality of custom, an 
autonomous and supra-ethical individual.”5 
 As we live in an unhappy (but even in this respect unexceptional) age 
that needs heroes,6 the heroism of obligation-generating promises could do 
no harm. This is so, even knowing the sins of faithful perseverance. Those 
sins hardly affect the mystery of the promise, so long as a promise is seen 
as a means of human autonomy, and not of subordination. 
 The decline of the morals of promise is due to social and economic 
reasons, which can hardly be influenced. Still, may law, as a relatively 
independent normative system, come to the rescue of promise? After all, 
rumour has it that law is a manifestation and a pillar of morals. Considering 
the connection between contracts and promises that constitute contracts, 
and taking into account the central role of contracts in the functioning of 
law, it seems worthwhile to analyse how a promise may give rise to legal 
obligations. 
  In legal philosophy, turning Is into Ought is just like the philosophers’ 
stone. How does an obligation emerge? Why are we obliged to do some-
thing? A realist would hold that and obligation is not more than a self-
deceiving expression of our desire to avoid punishment. An alchemist of 
legal philosophy may attempt to locate the source of obligations in some 
specific feature of promise. Promises can really give rise to moral obligations. 
Kant made gold but could not pour it into bars or turn in into fancy legal 
bijouterie. Law can not really make use of a moral obligation stemming 
from promise. Although Kant discussed promises giving rise to contracts 
in his theory of right, and not in his theory of morals, the discrepancy is 
even bigger than he would have ever had imagined. 
 Consider first the difference between “ordinary” promises and promises 
having a legal effect. A promise appearing in the context of the law of 
obligations, and especially in contract law, is a “promise aimed at a legal 
effect”, “offer and acceptance”, or declaration. Although this distinction is 
utterly justified under modern circumstances, a historical survey would 
suggest that there was another possible connection. Theoretically, it was 
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and, even today, it is possible to establish a system of contract law, which 
consistently asserts that a promise in itself constitutes an obligation, 
and, even more, an enforceable one. Conceptual analysis is followed by a 
detailed discussion of this issue. This discussion, however, will not explore 
in detail why modern systems of contract law distanced themselves from 
the legal protection of moral obligations arising from promises.  
 Thereafter, the analysis explores to what extent does promise generate 
obligation. While there are several theories on this, the present discussion 
is centred around the Kantian concept, because the Kantian concept is 
based on freedom. Kant’s metaphysic of morals provides moral norms of 
action as found in the state of freedom. Furthermore, the Kantian concept 
is the most consistent theory that locates the source of obligation in the 
person assuming an obligation. In comparison other theories appear to be 
heteronomous, as they justify obligations from the perspective of society 
or of the promisee, or they explain an obligation rising from a promise 
with reference to customs or coercion. Also, contemporary theories of 
contract, drawing on Aristotle, proceed from the aim of the promise, and 
not from the free expression of will exposed in a promise. These theories 
accept a promise as binding and a contract as valid, if the aim pursued by 
them is acceptable. Needless to say, such efforts seek the reformulation of 
law in terms of material justice, being in overt tension with other concepts 
of law based upon the autonomy of the promisor or the parties. 
 According to rivalling concepts, moral obligations stemming from 
promises differ in character and consequences—even for the purposes of 
law. The fourth section of the analysis is devoted to exploring which 
concept of obligation seems to provide the best way to establish the moral 
force of contract, and, in regulating contractual relations, what kind of 
moral order is reinforced and accepted by law. Experience suggests that 
the modern contact law is not guided by Kantian conceptions. Indeed, the 
same stands for modern legal systems in general, although allegedly the point 
of modern law is to safeguard liberty and a sphere of action for autono-
mous human beings. Legal norms—the promises of law—are indeterminate 
and disobeyed, features which suggest that the sovereign itself is not serious 
about its promises. Nonetheless, as suggested in the fifth part, this shall 
not prevent attempts to accord modern contract law with an individual 
moral of obligations pursuing Kantian conceptions of autonomy. May 
such efforts fail, an instrument for the critique of law has still been made 
available.  
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1. Promise and Contract 
 
Kant deals with promises in the context of acquisition by contract in his 
theory of right, when discussing the private law valid in the state of 
nature. Promise is an offer that can be pleasant for the one who accepts it. 
 Promise as a sign or phenomenon is quite different from legal phenomena. 
Using a term common in Hungarian legal terminology, a promise is not 
always of legal relevance [a “legal fact”], and even when it is a legal fact, 
it is often problematic to explain why it does not have a legal effect. In 
the ordinary sense of the word, any resolution addressed (communicated, 
intended to be directive or relative) to someone else concerning my 
actions amounts to a promise. In law only such public statements of will 
addressed to someone else are considered to be relevant, the addressee of 
which is identifiable. Certainly, such statements can be addressed to the 
general public. In his theory of right Kant discusses legally relevant 
promises in essentially similar terms.  
 According to Kant, it is only “the juridical relation of Man to Beings 
who have both Rights and Duties”7 that results in an actual connection 
between legal rights and duties. In Kant’s analysis, however, although the 
binding force of law lies in itself, law must still correspond to morals. The 
notion of right implies the ability to bind others. Nonetheless, if law 
obliges one to do things that he should do anyway in compliance with his 
moral duties, then the legal order is a legal order of freedom. Thus, law 
derives from freedom, from moral law determined by our-selves. If my 
promise is not morally binding on me, no one can impose on me a legal 
obligation. Others who oblige me take advantage of the situation, which 
was created by the obligation implied in my promise. Taking advantage of 
an opportunity opened up by moral law, however, does not give rise to an 
obligation. Nevertheless, as soon as a moral obligation has been created, 
legal regulation takes advantage of it in a rather arbitrary fashion and 
allows others to make use of it as well, thereby distancing law from 
morals. For instance, contract law (i.e. legal regulations applicable to the 
enforcement of contractual obligations) treats the obligee’s claims mainly 
without respect to the contents of the actual promise, and, thus, refusing 
to follow the morals of promise. Such ignorance is possible even for Kant: 
“it is not in Ethics, therefore, but in Jurisprudence, that the principle of 
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the legislation lies, that ‘promises made and accepted must be kept’. 
Accordingly, Ethics specially teaches that if the Motive-principle of 
external compulsion which Juridical Legislation connects with a Duty is 
even let go, the idea of duty is sufficient itself as a Motive.”8 
 Kant was not at all the first to distinguish the moral binding force of 
promise from the binding force of contractual offer and acceptance, or 
contract itself. Kant—among others—dealt with the theory of right and 
virtue because it was obvious that actions, which follow the law of reason 
that was rendered possible in the state of freedom, do not necessarily 
occur in real life. Something must bring human actions closer to the state 
of freedom: this is what law is for. According to Kant, in contrast with 
moral law, legal rules provide for action not solely on the basis of moral 
obligations. If an action complies with the rule because it was guided by 
the idea of duty, then the action has morality (“duty of virtue”). At this point, 
Kant refers to promise as an example.9 A promise, which must be kept 
because of its enforceability, is a matter of legal obligation. But keeping a 
promise without external compulsion is an act of virtue (“fidelity”). 
 According to Hungarian, French and German legal terminology and 
jurisprudence, a declaration which is not aimed to have a legal effect, does 
not give rise to a contract. The teleological character of the term “aim” might 
certainly become problematic. What should will and consciousness cover 
in order to trigger legal effects? An invitation to dinner might have 
connotations of boredom, dishwashing or a juicy stake for host and guest 
alike, while law does not cross their minds. Still, may one make a cruel 
joke out of a dinner invitation, when enforcing various legal consequences, 
the court will hold him for failing to seriously consider the foreseeable 
legal consequences of his actions.  
 Pursuant to classic common law, a gratuitous promise (where there is 
no consideration) does not give rise to a contract. Due to lack of acceptance 
(consideration) the promise is not legally binding. A sheer promise to 
transfer rights can not bring about a contract, since without consent there 
is no free act of will on the other side. In this case a promise does not 
establish and obligation, rather, it is a prolegomenon to self-binding. That 
is, anything that takes another person to consent qualifies as an attempt of 
self-binding. Binding force is attached to acceptance (consent, consideration), 
reliance, or confirmation by another person. Hegel’s position highlights this 
point: “the two wills are associated in an identity in the sense that one of 
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them comes to its decision only in the presence of the other”.10 “My will 
may become objective to me.”11 From the perspective of the morals of 
promise, however, acceptance is not constitutive, it reinforces the irre-
versibility of a promise at best. Kant himself says that a believed promise 
can not be withdrawn, since—using a modern term—it induces legal effects. 
Withdrawal is self-contradictory. More precisely, a person is bound by his 
promise until its withdrawn. Acceptance functions as a limitation on 
withdrawal, it bans withdrawal for the benefit of the acceptor. 
 Promisory estoppel and prompted interest (bíztatási érdek), its Hungarian 
equivalent, show that a promise (actions inducing it or the impression 
thereof) may give rise to an obligation without acceptance (consideration). 
This happens when a promise induces action or forbearance of another 
reasonable person, who suffers damages as a result. Thus, it seems that 
promise as a moral obligation has limited relevance for law: it is necessary 
to exclude the arbitrariness of the enforcement of a consequence, which 
corresponds to the promise made. Consent implied in a promise, its volun-
tariness repeals the arbitrariness of legal coercion.  
 Modern legal systems distinguish promise from contractual offer and 
acceptance. Contract law applies to such promises which are about creating 
or transferring rights. From another perspective, legal consequences are 
manifested before performance if and only if the other party relied upon 
the declaration in question and was adversely affected. As Fuller and Perdue 
submitted in 1936,12 expectations generated by the offer or interest associated 
with actions based upon those expectations are protected by contract law. 
 In contemporary law, no one would be surprised if a statement concerning 
an expensive gift would only be enforceable if made in writing. (Hungarian 
professional discourse is likely to centre on who gets to counter-sign it and 
for how much exactly.) Why does law not recognise an obligation stemming 
from a sheer promise? Why does a simple declaration not suffice? Why is 
there a need for acceptance in case of a gift? The reason is not that law is 
hostile to promises, rather, it is because law serves legal policy consi-
derations as well. And, mainly, without a requirement of writing, highly 
uncertain situations could emerge, raising innumerable problems of 
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evidence. Practice and theory are content with insisting that insignificant 
promises are irrelevant; legal policy considerations are not questioned; for 
they are obvious. Zweigert and Kötz take the casebook example for granted: if 
someone is invited for dinner but not allowed to enter the house, he can 
not successfully claim compensation for his taxi bill. In the name of 
seriousness, issues of promise, offer and legitimate expectations are put 
aside without any theoretical analysis. English law goes as far as stating that 
“An Englishman is liable, not because he has made a promise, but because 
he has made a bargain.”13 
 
 
2. Protection of Promise in the History of Contract Law 
 
Roman law denied the binding force of a mere promise, and as such, the 
binding force of a promise of a gift. Canon law recognised the legally 
binding nature of promise, but its validity and enforceability depended on 
the aim served by the promise. Probably there was one moment in history—
at the heyday of scholasticism—when contracts were meant to enforce 
promise-based obligations. In Gordley's view, however, this connection was 
based upon a conception of justice referring back to Aristotle.14  
 According to jurisprudence influenced by late scholasticism (Connanus, 
1508–1551), the promisor was bound only in respect to belief.15 In a legal 
sense, a promise created an obligation to the extent breaching the promise 
would have violated the principle of “do no harm to others”. Damages 
were adjusted to the credibility of a promise. Connanus’ position was 
unacceptable for Grotius. First, Grotius, an advocate of natural law based 
on the law of reason, rejected Connanus’ methodological presuppositions. 
Secondly, Connanus’ position would also have destroyed Grotius’ theory of 
international law. If a sheer promise is not legally binding, agreements of 
monarchs are irrelevant until they are being performed. And what is 
performance in the case of a peace treaty? Stopping the attacks, disbanding 
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troops, or what else?16 For a promise to be binding, or, for a promisor to 
be obliged to keep his promise, an a priori rule is needed. Grotius found 
this a priori rule in natural law: promises are binding by nature. 
 Grotius’ position17 dominated social contract theories for a long time. 
Note that, although Grotius insisted that promises are binding, he was of 
the view that a promise is enforceable by the other party only if the 
promise was for transferring rights and if it was made in the proper form. 
In a similar fashion, Pufendorf believed that only those promises are 
“perfect” and, thus, enforceable which were made to transfer rights. It is 
not entirely clear whether by way of a perfect promise the promisor creates 
a claim, or whether it actually confers the right about which the promise 
was made.18 Natural law dictates that promises shall be kept. Still, the 
obligation itself is based on the voluntary consent to transfer something 
that belongs to one. A simple expression of future intent does not make a 
promise enforceable.  
 The idea to connect the binding force of promise with the binding 
force of contract gained further support in the Continent: in the sway of 
18th-century freedom movements the concept of liberty was tied to autonomy. 
For the purposes of an attempt to make law correspond with liberty, the 
claim that “I am obligated because I obliged myself in my promise” sounds 
more attractive than any other competing explanation (e.g. I am obliged 
because the other party expects me to do something or did something).19 
This is so since in all other cases the source of obligation is external. All 
this might be of little significance today, but in the 19th century the 
craftsmen of the basic—and still used—principles of contract law were 
eager to accord their conceptual devices with contemporary concepts of 
freedom.  
 This emancipation based upon the principles of freedom was not at all 
accomplished by legislatures of bourgeois revolutions—revolutionaries 

 
16
 See Grotius, H.: De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II, XI. 
 
17
 Grotius: op. cit., II. 11, IV. 
 
18
 See von Pufendorf, S. F.: On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural 
Law [De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem], Cambridge, 1991, 70 
[IX. 7.]  
 
19
 There is a moment in Hungarian law, which is clearly dominated by promise. 
An offer sent by mail becomes irreversible from its receipt until the arrival of the 
response. Suppose that initially the addressee was hesitant to accept the offer and 
believes that no contract was made. Then, at the very last moment, he accepts the 
offer on the phone.  
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were not concerned about moral elements of still preserved in law. Rather, 
they were bothered by the substantive and structural arbitrariness of law.  
 Members of the drafting committee of the Code Civil, while constantly 
referring to natural law and liberty, did not do more than editing Domat’s 
ideas—ideas which were formulated before the revolution. In his remarks 
on contracts Domat did refer to freedom and will, in reality, however, all 
he (and others) did was cleaning law from concepts of scholastic theology, 
i.e. considerations of justice in quid pro quo. The creative jurists of the 
18th and 19th century were busy with trying to identify those promises 
among all morally binding undertakings, which could have a serious legal 
effect. In doing so they relied on technical factors independent of ethics 
and morals: they used tools as “causa” and “consideration”. In lack thereof, a 
promise could not amount to an expression or will or offer. At the same 
time, “promise” was replaced by “will” in the terminology of continental 
private law. It is worthy of attention that early advocates of the will theory 
occasionally did refer to will as a manifestation of private autonomy. Law, 
even when it becomes positive, can serve the morality of freedom—to this 
extent Savigny summarised the Kantian concept properly. Law safeguards 
the sphere of individual freedom of action. Law promotes morality not by 
executing moral norms. Rather, via legal institutions law makes it possible 
for everyone to realise their inherent moral qualities in conformity with 
the nature of things.20 In sharp contrast with justice based approaches, 
Savigny insists that besides freedom “there is no need for a second 
principle in the name of the common good”.21  
 According to Gordley, however, Savigny’s concept of freedom and his 
will theory are not connected to Kant.22 It is not longer promise that is 
binding—promise was replaced by will itself. A contract originating from 
the conformity of wills is but a metaphor. Nothing follows from two 
(expressions of) wills. Wills and words standing for them are not two atoms 
bonded in a molecule, the existence of which generates a new physical 
reality. Initially, craftsmen of the modern (Pandectist) contract theory did 
acknowledge this. In the words of Savigny, the act of willing is “an invisible 
event”. An act of willing can only be inferred from an expression of the will. 
Still, an expression may only be relied on to speculate about the possible 
will expressed. 
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 The legal treatment of the binding force of an offer demonstrates how 
limited respect for freedom is, when it is contingent upon the respect of 
will. Law determines the unilateral binding force of the offer—including 
its commencement and duration—in an automatic fashion, without regard 
to the intent of the offeror. Considerations about trade security serve as a 
standard justification for the rule, which is appropriate. Nonetheless, it 
clearly shows how law distanced itself already in the 19th century from 
the idea of will and from the promisor.  
 Replacing the problem of promise with the problem of the expressed 
will successfully detached contracts from the issue of moral binding force 
associated with promise, emancipated it from the confusing remains of 
moral thinking. The man of practice does not have to consider why a 
contract is binding. Promise emerged a novo as the moral basis for contract 
in the name of the protection of private autonomy when will theory lost its 
strength, owing not only to social and justice considerations, but also due 
to its own operational difficulties (e.g. problems of long-term co-operation, 
etc.). A purely formal theory of corresponding wills was hardly able to 
provide a justice-based revision of contract law, to reject its modern 
limitations. A morality-based theory that can refer to autonomy may be 
more successful in this respect. 
 
 
3. Is a Promise Binding, And If So, Why? 
 
Stricto sensu, promise gives rise to moral obligation if it commands the 
promisor “from inside”, without reference to external reasons, that is, if the 
promisor obliges himself by the promise. This position is clearly reminiscent 
of the Kantian concept of establishing obligations. The most convincing are 
those moral theories, which derive the moral obligation to keep a promise 
from individual autonomy. The promisor’s freedom receives its fullest 
recognition in this approach: the promisor is bound only with regard to 
himself, he is the cause of his own action. Other conceptions of the binding 
force of promise take the position of the recipient, the acceptor or beneficiary 
as a starting point. These theories explain the binding force of promise as a 
matter of responsibility triggered by the acceptor’s reliance on the promise. 
Furthermore, due to their influence on contract law, it is important to 
mention those moral conceptions which explain promise as a convention 
necessary for the functioning of society, without reference to corresponding 
duties. Also, there are theories which connect the binding force of promise 
with coercion mobilised in response to non performance. 
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 Hobbes and Locke established the state by way of a contract. 
According to Locke, the power of government is based upon keeping 
mutual promises.23 As Hume pointed out, however, Locke could not 
succeed in justifying why the contract itself was binding. The idea that 
promise in itself might have some particular quality that makes it binding 
did not occur to Locke. As he argued against Aristotle, concepts and 
things had no essence for him. By rejecting essentialism Locke held, that 
promise is binding for otherwise the concept would not make sense. May 
this be the case, it still is no answer to the question. Promise certainly 
embodies the notion of acting upon an obligation that was undertaken 
voluntarily, and the concept is used in this sense. Still, a given use of a 
concept does not lead to an obligation to act according to a certain 
meaning, or, at best, it directs behaviour in the conventional sense of the 
word: meaning would be impossible without a certain correspondence of 
actual actions. Those who use the word “promise” generate expectations 
in the addressees. 
 While this solution is popular even today, Hume was not content with it. 
According to him, the true explanation of binding force is a matter of 
convention. Within the context of direct relations of small societies, sanctions 
against those who failed to keep their promises generated a convention, 
which was then partly reinforced by law. In small societies, promise is 
aimed at co-operation (motivated primarily by self-interest). Breaking a 
promise renders this co-operation impossible. Expectations developed this 
way were internalised by time. This is why people act upon promises.24 25 
 According to Hume, one does not abandon up the benefits of his 
natural freedom without compensation. Promise, thus, is conditional: it 
becomes unconditional and binding only in exchange for consideration (in 
politics, it is the protection provided by government / the sovereign). Of 
course, other than the rationality of interests, nothing explains why 
keeping a promise should be tied to the performance of others. According 
to this approach, only those promises are binding which are kept due to 
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on promise—its political organisation existed without simultaneous events, any 
specific act of obligation, or any act of obligation concerning the future. 
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 See Hume, D.: A Treatise on Human Nature (eds.: Sir L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. 
H. Nidditch). 2nd ed. Oxford, 1992. 541 [Book III, Part II, s.8]. 
 
25
 This explanation, however, undermines the binding force of promise, since 
breaching a promise will only amount to the violation of a convention. See Fried, 
Ch.: Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation. Cambridge, Mass., 
London: Harvard University Press, 1981, 15. 
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the dictates of self-interest (and of conceivable compulsion)—the rest does 
not count. This, however, makes promise an impracticable social institution, 
since the interests of the promisor are hard to foresee. This perception is 
in conflict with the concept of promise itself: under this approach a 
promise is not a statement about one’s future actions.  
 Note, however, that Hume made an attempt to turn fidelity into a moral 
obligation via a self-limiting argument. He holds that people keep their 
promises, because society would crumble if promises were abandoned 
upon the dictates of self-love. Thus, rejecting the submission that promise 
is an act of self-biding brings by an even more absurd explanation. After 
all, the alternative explanation presupposes self-interested people caring 
for society, people who “limit themselves” by an ex post judgement driven by 
their concern for society, thus solving the bootstrapping problem.26 Still, 
when building a system on an empirical basis one has to acknowledge that 
people are free-riders. According to Hume, however, there is no need to 
base the obligation to obey the sovereign on some concept of promise (i.e. 
citizenship in modern terminology)—everything is “justified” by admitting 
that there is no society without allegiance and fidelity. The standard 
counter-argument holds that acknowledging the above will compel anyone 
to participation in upholding the institution. In a situation when self-
interest commands to the contrary, one is not likely to observe the binding 
force of a promise simply because otherwise the necessary institution will 
not function in the long run. That is, except if one is a moral being in the 
Kantian sense, or, if one is afraid of disclosure or coercion.  
 Furthermore, Hume submits that in local communities, breaching a 
promise has extremely serious consequences among the members of the 
community. Aristotle claims that the one who does not keep a promise in a 
community, can not be virtuous. This consideration, however, does not 
apply in relation to outsiders: deception of strangers does not matter, more 
precisely, it is an admirable feint. As to legal agreements, Roman public 
and private law alike attributed little significance to promises (the 
institution of naturalis obligatio gained significance only later, partly due 
to Greek influence). Enforceable promises were established by sacral acts. 
What mattered was transfer (traditio), performance itself—this was the bar 
to reclaiming a promised and transferred object, or recalling performance. 
While this solution is appropriate for the legal needs of closed societies, it 
became inconvenient for the purposes of trade in imperial Rome. The tribal 
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way of thinking, which attributes binding force to promises only within the 
group, is completely dysfunctional in modern, anonymous societies utterly 
settled upon exchange of goods. With the disappearance of the tribe as the 
natural background of binding promises, and in lack of a natural community 
within which promises should be kept, the fate of promise is sealed. There is 
no community any longer in which promises are to be kept: public sphere 
consists of strangers.27 
 According to sociological or (in the Kelsenian sense) pure concepts of 
legal theory, a promise giving rise to a right shall be kept due to external legal 
coercion. Quoting La Rochefoucauld: “we promise according to our hopes, 
and we hold according to our fears.”28  
 While for Locke contract is a means to construe government, for Hart 
promise is the baseline of the entire modern legal system. Hart regards legal 
rule itself as a promise. Legal rules are binding as promises. The legislator, 
the executive and the judiciary promise the application of the rule. For Hart, 
promise (and the legal rule that is in itself a promise) binds the promisor by 
way of external rules upon which the action promised is to take place. The 
binding force is dependent upon the external condition (the existence of 
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the rule and some further factors behind the rule). Promise is to be kept for 
heteronomous, external reasons that do not concern the promisor.29 Hart 
takes promise as a means necessary in economic relations, as an instrument of 
self-biding. Empirically this approach might be close to contract law’s notion 
of recognition of promise, but as a practical or utilitarian consideration, it 
amounts to an component of moral theory on law, and not a moral basis 
for law.  
 According to Kant, the action following one’s own act of choice (reason) 
presents the action as objectively necessary, i.e. makes it a duty30 by 
adjusting it to the moral law. Just to avoid misunderstanding: “The activity 
of the Faculty of Desire may proceed in accordance with Conceptions; and 
in so far as the Principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind, 
and not in its object it constitutes a Power acting or not acting according to 
liking.
 In so far as the activity is accompanied with the Consciousness of the 
Power of the action to produce the Object, it forms an act of Choice”.31 It 
means (simplifying the point) that the act of choice is the action governed 
from inside and recognized as that. One keeps a promise because of the 
dictates of the law of reason. Any other action would be contradictory: if 
keeping promises is not rendered as the general standard of action, it will be 
impossible for anyone to promise. Promise ceases to exist just like the 
possibility of autonomous action. 
 “For, the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to 
be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not 
keeping it would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself 
impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but would 
laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses.”32  
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 The first part of the above quotation reads as follows: “Another finds himself 
urged by need to borrow money. He well knows that he will not be able to repay it 
within a determinate time. He would like to make such a promise, but he still has 
enough conscience to ask himself: is it not forbidden and contrary to duty to help 
oneself out of need in such a way? Supposing the he still decided to do so, his maxim 
of action would go as follows: when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall 
borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know this will never happen. 
Now this principle of self-love or personal advantage is perhaps quite consistent with 
my whole future welfare, but the question now is whether it is right. I therefore turn 
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 As the promisor follows his own law, his action corresponds to moral 
duty. But why does the rule of reason command promises to be kept? Duty 
is to be followed, says Kant. But why? When criticising Mendelssohn, 
Kant rejects the question itself. In his theory of right Kant submits: “The 
question is put thus: ‘Why ought I to keep my Promise?’ for it is assumed as 
understood as understood by all that I ought to do so. It is, however, 
absolutely impossible to give any further proof of the Categorical Imperative 
implied... It is a Postulate of the Pure Reason...”33 This remark applies to 
promise in contractual relations. So the question makes no sense in law—
and only in law. George Fletcher, commenting upon Kant’s above mentioned 
standpoint, finds that in contract law freedom of action falls under 
limitations by way of promise, as certain decisions are handed over to the 
other party. “The different outcomes under the moral and legal theory 
highlight divergent concerns: the former with the promisor's internal 
struggle and the latter with the problem of power and control between two 
distinct individuals.”34 
 Kant does not elaborate on the origin of the binding force of offer, 
finding that it is impossible to prove and shall be accepted as a categorical 
imperative. Nonetheless, outside the theory of right it well might be 
possible to find some moral reason that explains the binding force of 
promise. Then, this moral basis might affect law, and, by the same token, 
contract as well. 
 Certain versions of the Kantian conception do not take the promisor’s 
relation to himself as the basis for the obligation to keep promises. In this 
respect, Charles Fried’s attempt is remarkable. In his book of 1981 Fried 
establishes the binding force of modern contract upon promise: “since a 
contract is first of all a promise, a contract must be kept because a 
promise must be kept.”35 According to Fried, men are free for they can 
                                                                                                                                               
the demand of self-love into a universal law and put the question as follows: how 
would it be if my maxim became a universal law? I then see at once that it could never 
hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself, but must necessarily 
contradict itself.” 
 The Kantian tenet of self-contradiction and the collapse of the social institution 
of promise as its consequence can also be found in Locke and in Hume’s con-
ventionalism. Kant, however, connects those elements to autonomous action, and 
turns them into an internal law of action. 
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establish contacts with others, human freedom is realised in those relations, 
and this is the source of the binding force of promise—and, at the same 
time, its moral basis, as it is an act of freedom. “An individual is morally 
bound to keep promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention 
whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect 
the promise performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to 
invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite.”36 Immorality consists in 
abusing someone’s confidence and, by way of that, not treating the other 
person as an autonomous being. This is morally wrong. 
 A variation of Fried’s approach is to hold that the promisee’s trust is 
an assumption regarding the promisor as an autonomous being. In this 
context failure to perform undermines the promisor’s autonomy. One, who 
wants to be autonomous, also has to act as an autonomous being in 
relation to others. Promises must to be kept to avoid being seen as an 
abuser of confidence. Moral duty is replaced by virtue, or, perhaps, by the 
social sanction. 
 While Fried takes into consideration the promisor’s morality, other 
theories seek the binding force of promise in its impacts on others who 
rely upon it. Promise triggers an expectation (confidence), and violating it 
is unjust or morally wrong. Scanlon,37 for example, derives the binding 
force of promise from the detrimental consequences caused by the violation of 
the promise to those who relied on it. According to principles requiring 
the avoidance of harm, a breach of promise adversely affecting another 
person is morally wrong. Everyone, including the promisor, is under a 
duty to refrain from causing disadvantage or harm to others. Avoiding 
wrongfulness is the promisor’s moral duty. (Consequently, if a breach of 
promise is not detrimental, there is no violation of duty. The same applies 
when some greater harm is avoided by breaching a promise.)  
 When focusing on how the promisor may be discharged of the promise 
it is easy to point out the difference between this external justification of 
the binding force of promise implied in the assertion of claims and the 
Kantian justification that centres around the promisor. A promise is not to 
be kept if the promisee releases the promisor. Did the person released this 
way keep his promise? Shall he still condemn himself in foro interno? 
Furthermore, how shall an external observer view the ones favoured by 
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benevolence and equity? What kind of a freedom can be completely 
dependent upon others?  
  I regard a stricter version of moral obligation as valid. This approach 
seeks the basis of the obligation in the act itself, and not in the relation-
ship with the addressee. If a promise is kept because someone else expects 
it (or enforces it), then the cause of the action does not lie in the actor. 
What makes a being autonomous is the reason why he keeps his promise. 
He does not keep his promise for he promised to someone else, but 
because of himself. The duty to oneself becomes the basis for keeping a 
promise. The obligation derives from one’s own freedom and autonomy 
and not from the recognition of another’s autonomy via a promise. Assuming 
an obligation is an act and a consequence of freedom. Following Kant, the 
person who acts upon an obligation, is a moral being—who chooses to 
follow the law of reason. Thus, acting in fulfilment of an obligation that 
originates from a promise amounts to a duty (unless the duty is not 
contrary to the law of reason, that is a very low standard). It means that by 
keeping a promise without regard to any other person, one justifies himself 
as a moral being.  
 Promise leads to self-obligation as follows.  
 Suppose that I have an idea concerning some future action of mine. I 
may go jogging in the park today. It is time to go jogging in the park, etc. 
 To this idea, I attribute the character of a decision. The question is 
what makes the idea of a future action into a resolution. The issue can be 
approached in an empirical way—I adjust some of my plans and particular 
actions to it. The connection can be rather weak when this adjustment 
remains on the level of ideas. But if I go to bed earlier or prepare my 
shoes, I actually reinforce my decision by actions. I may also underpin my 
resolution by means of social representation: I make a vow. For a religious 
person, this is a serious obligation as the believer exposes himself to the 
judgements and sanctions of an imaginary external force. The force can be 
external in the sense that in the case of breaching the vow, one anticipates 
the punishment of fate—that is, one attaches a sanction to it. But one does 
not have to be a believer to be able to self-oblige. Self-obligation might be 
a case of normal schizophrenia or the ability of man to reflect upon 
himself. What transforms an idea into a resolution is that one renders 
the realization of the resolution to become the measure of his moral 
judgement on himself. Certainly, this is possible on different levels of 
consciousness, and can work not only in anticipation but subsequently as 
well. I have not gone jogging for a week (with all sorts of excuses)—if I 
do not go tomorrow, I am a good-for-nothing (lazy, stupid, etc.) man. (The 
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condemnation might be not only moral, but also intellectual, although 
even in the latter case it has a moral fault behind it. Stupidity or ignorance 
of health is one’s moral fault.) 
 Suppose that I announce: from now on, I will go jogging every morning 
(I make an announcement that I made a vow to myself on jogging).38 This 
promise will already be subject to sanctions (backbiting, contempt, etc.). 
What will be the ground for contempt? My own breach of obligation. I will 
be condemned for breaching my obligation, although my action was not 
detrimental to anyone else, no one could establish any material expectation 
on me: the action concerned only myself.  
 Telling someone that “I promised myself to go jogging from now on” 
is not a promise in the legal sense of the word. It is different than saying: 
“I promise you to go jogging every morning”. In a legal system based on 
the morals of promise, it would be a promise giving rise to an obligation, 
an enforceable promise. Whether law will really provide protection against 
breaching this promise is a different matter. After all, what kind of right did I 
confer upon the promisee? A right to see me jogging? Without conferring 
a right, there is no contract, no legal obligation. 
 Before dwelling on the possible legal relevance of the concept of “promise 
as obligation”, it is in place to mention a potential practical counter-argument. 
With becoming widespread such a practical approach undermines the very 
possibility of moral existence in everyday life. “Undermining” describes a 
situation where insisting on promises results in a recurrent failure of one’s 
way of living. The counter-argument holds that it is completely irrelevant 
how one defines himself—all that matters is the social context. The whole 
line or argument is foolish, it is the logic of the blockhead. Why would it 
be wrong to depart from one’s resolution? Why should one do something 
that is unpleasant or that is against his interests? The principle of pacta 
sunt servanda
 is based on the premise that an offer can not be against the 
offeror’s interests, as there is consideration for his performance. Where 
public opinion does not find the interest satisfied, promise is not binding 
and it does not have to be kept. Adaptation is freedom itself. Even the 
promise made to someone else is not to be kept unless the other party can 
force me to perform. As others have expectations, and costs based on 
those expectations, others put a system [like law] in motion if observing a 
promise is instrumental to their interests.  
 This line of argument allows for the existence of promise only as mere 
reflectivity. Empirically a promise is binding to the extent there is a chance 
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for successful enforcement. This approach may culminate in destructive 
tendencies: the less likely it is to expect a promise to be kept, the more 
resources are needed for the enforcement thereof. In the meantime, the 
chances of calling an amoral promisor to account are diminishing, due to 
the availability of limited resources. Various dubious and desperate efforts 
were made in modern times to devise techniques for securing performance; 
solutions range from expensive guarantees to blacklisting violators and 
non-performers. Still, modern law and modern standards of conduct widely 
tolerate non-performance, they settle for paying damages. In these cases 
the amount of damages is adjusted not to the value of a promise, but to the 
“reasonability” of the expectation generated by the promise. In trade relations 
it is acceptable to breach a promise and to deliver to someone else, if the 
other person pays a higher price. A seller is reasonable as long as the 
profit made this way is higher than the damages to be paid, that is, as long 
as the contracting party suffering harm can obtain the goods at a price 
lower than the price received by the seller. According to economic analysis, 
this is about cost-effective expenditure, and, thus, constitutes a reasonable 
course of action. Morality seems to be irrational. Coercion to enforce a 
promise is expensive. Then why keep a promise? No one will be caught 
anyway. 
 Any conception that takes promise as generating some obligation must 
respond to the following problem.39 I receive a thousand pounds in exchange 
for promising that I will pay it back. Do I have to pay it back because I 
received it? Or because I promised to repay it? More people believe that 
they would pay the money back because they had received it, because it 
does not belong to them. It may well be that this conception is backed by 
respect for property, and not by ethical premises upon the principle of 
promise. It would be unjust to keep what belongs to someone else. As a 
result of a failure to follow the rule voluntarily, what is owed might be 
taken away in line with the requirements of corrective justice. Logic 
behind the rule of positive law also promotes the interest in seeing a loan 
returned: it has to be returned because it was given. The enforcement of 
returning a loan is not based on the binding force of promise; promise is 
almost irrelevant from a legal perspective, or from the perspective of the 
creditor. For law a promise to repay is less relevant than restoring the 
state of affairs that conforms with justice. That is, regardless of promise, a 
usurious interest rate on a loan does not have to be paid. Morally, for 
autonomous morals of obligation, one is not condemned for having obtained 

 
39
 Atiyah: Promises. op. cit. 34. 
 PROMISE AND CONTRACT: ON THE LIMITED ROLE OF SOCIAL IDEAS 77 
  
something, but because of the promise made in regard to that thing. 
Otherwise this case would be similar to finding a banknote, even knowing 
to whom it belongs—and not handing it over. This is not a great honour, 
but is not a problem of fidelity either.  
 Promise is an act of freedom by which one establishes a rule to himself. 
If someone does not admit to being bound by his promise, he excludes his 
own freedom. Freedom is justified by way of voluntary (in Kantian terms, 
arbitrary) constraint, by voluntary self-denial. One has free will (one is free) 
only in case what is willed derives from himself, if one sets tasks for himself.  
 
 
4. The Relationship of Promise and Obligation Asserted in Contract 
and in Contract Law 
 
Contract law preserves something from the moral characteristics of promise. 
According to Fried contracts can be understood in light of promise as a 
moral concept. Scanlon holds that the similarities between promise and 
contract are due to shared values they are rooted in. Although, as Scanlon 
adds, these values trigger different reactions in law and in moral theory, 
thus, promise and contract are parallel concepts.40  
 There are various, competing conceptions on the moral binding force 
of promise. Furthermore, despite all attempts of international unification, 
legal families provide different solutions. What is the role of obligation 
established by a promise in legal solutions? 
 Kant sharply contrasts duties of virtue and duties of right, i.e. duties 
that can not be based upon the sense of duty that is to be found in every 
rational being.41 A creditor can not tell a debtor that “you are obliged to 
pay it back by your own reason”. Still, there is such a moral obligation. In 
principle, it would be possible for a legal rule to enforce promise-based 
obligations. At certain points in history, law was not far from this, and the 
established principles of modern continental legal systems seem to 
correspond. Law, even if it becomes positive, can serve the morality of 
freedom. Even Savigny, this rather authoritarian Prussian minister of justice, 
thought that he had to believe and proclaim it. 
 Regarding the relevance of promise for contract law, it is important to 
examine certain factors which create the impression that promise (the 
contents of an offer) is of secondary significance, if not irrelevant al-
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together. Especially German jurisprudence excels in reading clauses into 
contracts never contemplated by the parties. Nonetheless, promise, or 
offer may be relevant even if it does not cover the promised performance 
or its conditions. Also, if a party is released from a contract due to the 
change of circumstances [clausula rebus sic stantibus], it is not to mean 
that promises are not binding. The promisor’s intent does not have to 
extend to complicated future situations. In principle—unless there is a 
reason to suppose otherwise—it is acceptable as a premise that a promise 
covers everyday, common or foreseeable situations,42 and it is binding to 
such extent. Note that a promise is an act of freedom and is universalis-
able to the extent it complies with rules of reason. 
 In order to examine the validity and predictive force of various moral 
conceptions, it is instrumental to compare their views on the moral binding 
force of promise and the legal regulations of performance at the three stages 
of the contract’s existence. Such an analysis might reveal moral conceptions 
underlying contemporary legal regulations. The three stages to examine are: 
conclusion of the contract—with particular reference to the binding force of 
offer; performance—focusing on the requirement of good faith and co-ope-
ration; and breach of contract—concentrating on the target of legal sanctions. 
 
1. How long is the offeror bound by the offer without any contractual 
stipulation in this regard? And, provided that promise has any significance, 
may the offeror set a date for that ex post? Regarding the binding force of 
an offer, common law and civil law jurisdictions developed radically different 
solutions.43 Under common law, an offer may be revoked any time before its 
acceptance, even in if the offer contained an express stipulation on its 
validity. This is an instance of complete disregard of the principle of 
promise. This effect is somewhat eased as the rule does not apply to offers 
made upon consideration. The binding force of an offer, thus, depends on 
an external factor, although not on the expectations of another person. In 
U.S. jurisprudence an offer is not revocable irrespective of consideration, 
when another person acted relying on the offer. The freedom of revoking an 
offer is further relaxed, as acceptance does not have to reach the offeror: 
an offer becomes irrevocable when acceptance is placed in the mailbox of 
the offeror.  
 In Romanist legal systems, and, thus, in French jurisprudence, damages 
are due if an offer is revoked before its acceptance. Courts determine the 

 
42
 BH 1986/11. 469. 
 
43
 See Zweigert—Kötz: op. cit., 351. 
 PROMISE AND CONTRACT: ON THE LIMITED ROLE OF SOCIAL IDEAS 79 
  
binding force of offer on a case–by–case basis. Some hold that damages 
are due because the revocation of an offer breaches a fictitious preliminary 
contract on the binding force of the offer. This is the fiction of the promise 
principle. According to another conception, however, this is a tort—a 
conception which is in accord with Scanlon’s views.  
 Pursuant to the promise-based solution of Art.862(3) of the Austrian 
Civil Code (ABGB), the offeror is bound by his offer, he could not be 
released by any act of revocation. S.145 of the German Civil Code (BGB) 
provides a similar solution. The offeror has to state that the offer was 
made ohne obligo, this way turning the offer into a call for offers (tender), 
which upon acceptance is then transformed into a consent by silence on 
the basis of the principle of co-operation in good faith (Treu und Glauben). 
In theory this is a case for the morals of promise. Courts, however, are 
tampering with such promises. In addition, an offer is effective until it 
reaches the addressee. Regarding this rule the findings of Zweigert and 
Kötz are characteristic of a legalistic approach. They hold that the German 
solution is rational because the events are controlled by the offeror, thus, 
it makes perfect sense to allocate risks on his side.  
 The approach of the Hungarian Civil Code is also radical: an offer, a 
promise, is transient unless the will wants it otherwise. But the offer (the 
“expression of intent”) by its nature seems to disperse into air, unless the 
watchful acceptor catches it with the butterfly-net of his will before it would 
vanish altogether. This solution is utterly reasonable for the purposes of 
trade security. Still, what kind of promise is this, from the perspective of the 
binding force of promise? In the case of transactions between parties who 
are not present, the offer is binding as long as a response may be expected 
under ordinary circumstances. Pursuant to Art. 211(2) of the Hungarian Civil 
Code, the usual period is to be estimated with regard to the means of transmission. 
To this extent the Hungarian Civil Code is closer to the promise-principle, 
although it supplements the promise principle with trade customs and 
practices. The means of sending the offer may indicate the durability of a 
promise. To the extent the validity of a promise is established on the basis 
of its form, the reference to trade customs is used to establish the binding 
force of the promise. Still, the custom applicable to the arrival of the offer is 
about the qualities of performance, and not of promise itself. No matter how 
reasonable, the rule reinforces trade customs and practices, but not promise. 
Therefore, it does not follow the logic of self-binding reflected in promise. 
Promise, or will, creates an occasion for applying legal conventions.  
 Promise as a source of obligation is secondary even in German and 
Hungarian law. Will mainly stands to make it possible for a party to 
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subject himself freely to the rules of the game prescribed in law. Even if it 
is supposed that the moral of promise is acknowledged in positive law, 
unless there are express reservations, an offer does not serve the observance 
of a promise—it binds the promisor pursuant to conventions defined in 
contract law. The logic of these conventions is by no means adjusted to 
the promisor’s moral absolutism. Instead, it is guided by considerations on 
trade security and risk allocation. Conventions on the binding force of 
offer do not maximise the binding force of promise. Without an express 
disposition of the offeror, the choice of an autonomous subject is rather 
limited: he makes an offer by mail, by telephone, his offer is about sale 
and purchase, lease, etc. What is not mentioned in the offer, is added by 
statute and by courts. Such supplements, however, do not respect the 
presumable will of the offeror. With a rough offer, the offeror submits 
himself to contractual conventions. Like a chess-master, the offeror may 
pick an opening. A contracting party, however, has less freedom than a 
chess player, as parties to a contract shall make their further moves in 
compliance with the law. This is far stricter of a constraint than deciding 
which figure to move. A contracting party who is silent about cogent and 
dispositive rules is like a chess player with no creativity, a player who 
opts for Nimzo indian defense and, after the opening, sticks to the moves 
of game 21 of the Capablanca-Alekhine title match of 1927. 
 
2. Co-operation upon good faith is the guiding principle of the Hungarian 
Civil Code. This would even follow from the concept of promise: if a promise 
is binding, one has to act upon it as long as the promise is effective. 
Good faith concerns primarily the promisor. Secondarily and consequently, it 
also concerns the other party who makes a promise in respect to his 
consideration. The promisor—according to the convention concerning 
promise or his own law of reason—has to suppose that his partner is 
acting in good faith. Indeed, promise corresponds to a “univerzalisable” 
law of reason in the sense and to the extent that every promise establishes 
an obligation. Hence, one has to regard as binding not only his own 
promises but also those promises made by the other party, at least until the 
other party breaches his promise, or until one can reasonably suppose that 
the other party will breach his promise (the latter being recognized by 
English law as anticipatory breach). Without a specific meaning attributed 
to it in law, an expression of will would mean that a promise is to be taken 
seriously, one can not be released from it upon random excuses. According to 
Cicero, it is unjust to breach a standard created for ourselves: “justice 
rests upon the foundation stone of good faith, that is to say, truthfulness 
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and scrupulous observance of promises and covenants … [T]he term fides, 
‘good faith’, originally signified a promise which has been kept (fiat)”.44 
Law can do nothing about it. Economy needs average dishonest people 
who set up rules for themselves, or at least such judges are needed who 
would decide accordingly. In the name of fairness and good faith, one does 
not have to do everything at all to keep a promise. The standard of liability 
for cooperation is what is generally expectable in a given situation. 
 
3. Breach of contract. In order to render the rules of the game un-
ambiguous, the accomplishment of private law is to provide sanction for 
breach of conventions. Primarily this is achieved not by enforcing a proper 
step, i.e. a convention. A solution unusual in private law is to punish the 
mischief (although see the crimes of bankruptcy). Or, as a far more typical 
reaction, it proceeds from the assumption that the other party is expected 
to follow the law, and, thus, private law puts the party who (supposedly) 
relies on the behaviour of the other party to a state in which he would 
have been if the rule had been complied with. But private law does not 
restore or create a state called for by the promise. When contract law, or 
civil law in general, concentrates on damages caused by a certain conduct, 
it turns out to be indifferent about the conduct itself. 
 As to expectations concerning the performance of a contract, at the 
outset, there is a remarkable difference between common law and civil law 
legal systems that were under Pandectist (and later German) influence. By 
now these systems, despite textual and doctrinal differences, have remarkably 
converged, just as it was predicted by Eörsi’s “veiled convergence” 
theory.45 Contrary to common law, civil law legal systems are based upon 
the principle of performance in kind, thus, promise appears to be enforce-
able, performable. “The principle of pacta sunt servanda, as has already 
been pointed out, was not merely a tenet enforced by the State but was on a 
highly respected place in the moral value scale. (...) The pacta sunt 
servanda
 principle was based on the ‘sanctity’ of private ownership and the 
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will of the private owner: it protected private ownership by attaching to the 
freedom of will the acceptance of responsibility for freely resolved acts.”46  
 In practice, however, legal systems that insist upon pacta sunt servanda 
offer a choice to the adversely affected party between performance in kind 
and damages. Despite the culture of will, promise is a ticket to a game 
where one either performs or pays according to the intent of the other 
party. Why would one insist on performance in kind by a party who already 
caused much trouble, when the problem can be easily settled through the 
market? The market of modern economy offers innumerably more options 
of covering purchase than closed society that was familiar to the Pandectists. 
The binding force of promise is weakened further in the light of the object 
of compensation, i.e. what damages are meant to cover, what state should 
the promisee be put via compensation. Does compensation really put a 
promisee in a state which he would have been, had the promise been kept? 
The answer goes in the negative in the legal systems of virtually modern 
market economies. The state of affairs as promised is rarely ever the sole 
controlling factor. Typically, courts take into consideration the actual (or 
reasonably expectable) conduct of the acceptor. In this respect, the reliance 
theory of common law provides the most straightforward example, allowing 
compensation only for damages occurring in relation to conduct in reliance 
of the promise. Thus, compensation is based not on promise, but on the trust 
of the other party. In cases where only actual damages are covered the 
concept of restitution delivers a similar outcome in continental legal systems. 
In addition, Hungarian law imposes an active duty on the promisee to 
mitigate damages. The notion of damages does not cover the collapse of the 
promisee’s personal expectations. Law is indifferent to mental frustration. 
De minimis non curat. Humiliation and unremedied resentment, even if 
cause by public authorities, belong to human condition. The other is not 
hell, but the business partner is at least purgatory. 
 Consequently, while modern contract law, and especially continental 
contract law, preserves some components that refer to an obligation 
stemming from promise, the predicting force of a heteronymous concept 
of obligation is still greater. Nonetheless, even the latter is not asserted in 
a consistent manner, partly because of legal policy considerations (i.e. the 
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judiciary’s convenience), and partly on the basis of references to material 
justice. 
 When contract is cleaned from the ornaments of the phraseology of 
legal ideology, the difference between promise based on individual 
autonomy and facts constituting contracts is striking. From the perspective 
of moral of autonomy, contract, and even law as such, is amoral, or more 
precisely, immoral. Considerations relevant for concluding contracts can 
not contribute to the respect for promises, to reinforcing the moral order 
of freely assumed duties. Contract law turns its back on autonomy. In 
Germany, perhaps because it was impossible to live with the burdens 
imposed by omitting to repair the flaws of the BGB, courts reformulated 
contract law in the name of the principle of Treu and Glauben—and not 
only in cases where the parties were silent. Working against allegedly 
insensitive and selfish private autonomy, reformulation took place in the 
name of ad hoc social justice.  
 In the history of contract law there were several attempts to link contracts 
with moral concepts other than the one based on promise. While such 
attempts may comply with the political agenda of the day, due to their 
judicial arbitrariness and desultoriness, they can not serve predictability. 
In order to define ethical standards, they refer to vague ideas of justice 
expressed in legal norms; such ethical standards are meant to determine 
which elements of a promise should be kept.47 According to this approach, 
justice dictates that a promise may establish a contractual obligation only 
by way of acceptance. The disciples of Pythagoras taught that justice lied 
in reciprocity. “Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain 
and a sort of loss, viz. those which are involuntary; it consists in having 
an equal amount before and after the transaction.”48 It would be unjust in 
respect to commutative justice if one party failed to react in exchange 
for the actions of the other party. Promise becomes binding by way of 
acceptance and performance: as a gesture of avoiding injustice. Only such 
promises are binding that serve a just purpose, leading to the requirement 
equivalence of values exchanged.  
 Still, there are logical difficulties concerning the assertion of just promises. 
The requirement of commutative justice will not resolve the problem arising 
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from situations where both parties had made their promises but neither has 
performed yet. This problem is typical in consensual theories. When 
neither promise is enforced, commutative justice is not violated. Benevolent 
donations may cause further problems. Following Aristotle, Thomas of 
Aquinas proclaimed that, in respect to promises and gifts there is no 
reciprocity, while there clearly is a duty. Law must enforce promises 
serving virtue and justice. This ethical approach is reinforced by claims 
concerning material justice and by the entire social conception of law.  
 Suppression of the moral of promise in contract law is more than a 
simple change in ideology. Reference to morality affects obedience to law. 
It does matter whether the glaze is made of paper or burned sugar. Crème 
brulee is all about the glaze—try to replace it with cardboard. In the context 
of contracts, governmental coercion to enforce contracts or damages is 
accepted, and—even more—expected, because in doing so government acts 
in accordance with the requirements of good morals. It takes a closer analysis to 
show that moral expectations are irrelevant for the state, and that the state 
considers not the position of the one who is acting, but the position of the 
one who is expecting. Moreover, law determines when and to what extent a 
promise is worthy of enforcement without being consistent about moral standards. 
It is certain that law tends to promote the cause of the victims quiet inconsistently, 
at least as a pro forma gesture of self-justification. This still seems to be 
sufficient to preserve the façade of law’s “morality”. This is all what is left from 
the concept of “law’s ethical minimum”. It is still another issue, whether society 
is willing to acknowledge legal norms and their enforcers as effective safeguards 
of moral order on the basis of actual legal norms and their enforcement.  
 
 
5. What is Contract Law For, or, To What Extent is It Possible to Divert 
Legal Conventions Towards an Individual Moral Course? 
 
Gyula Eörsi would be right in finding the lament on the decline of the 
morals of promise outdated.49 After all, the mobilising slogans of con-
temporary law are stabilisation of monopoly capitalist economy, social-
welfare issues, the “protection of the weak”, economic and legal efficiency. 
However, there is no lamentation here, since as Vilmos Peschka rightly 
observed, subjective morality in itself can not determine the ethical.50 It is 
still considerable whether autonomy may influence law at all via ethics, this 
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distillation of momentary truths. Keeping in mind the characteristics of law, 
a consistently promise-based law might not even be necessary. It is still 
noteworthy, though, that moral as reflected in socially filtered ethics 
determining law appears as distant memories of a teenage love affair.  
 Even Kant did not hold that morals may determine law, or may determine 
actions against the law. He regarded legal obligations as autonomous. None-
theless, it is worth reconsidering the critical and assertive role moral premises 
may have vis-à-vis law. The mirror held by the morals of autonomy in front of 
the contracting party and contract law reflects a rather unattractive image. 
Codification attempts in the 19th century aimed to save the world from 
jurisprudence and unjust customs.51 Legislation could not find a better task 
ever since. What is the task of contract law, that is, of legal rules applicable to 
contracts? Can it promote the autonomy of the parties, if that holds one of the 
parties captive? What kind of justice can it impose upon the parties, and to 
what extent? By what dictates of reason does it remedy the weak predictive 
capacities of contracting parties and their treatment of unforeseeable events?  
 Upon the morals of promise it was (and still is) possible to draft such 
laws for contracts, which would be more consistent about justice than the 
kind of material justice that invades contracts jurisprudence and suppresses 
autonomy. Promise-autonomy could become a basis for more stringent legal 
rules, which are not based on reliance. Such rules are not necessarily less 
effective than contemporary solutions. One-sided mightiness may well be 
reduced on Kantian premises, keeping in mind that one’s freedom does not 
go beyond the boundaries of the freedom of other’s. Within such a concept, 
abuse of power may result in invalidity without having to give way to 
convoluted attempts of judicial paternalism in the name of material justice. 
As Lajos Vékás observed “social requirements concerning social justice 
proved stronger than any ideal and classical principle … [I]n industrialised 
societies assuring the common good to the greatest possible extent is possible 
by way of a democratic form of government”.52 It does not follow, however, 
that this would require a kind of openness that renders possible nothing 
but judicially assisted business pragmatism and statutory intervention that 
satisfies the needs of political populism without consistent governmental 
enforcement measures.  
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 It is not at all peculiar for dispositive (and, incidentally, cogent) statutory 
provisions to remedy gaps opened by carelessness or lack of time. The question 
rather is when comes the time for legal intervention to fill those gaps. 
According to Oliver Wendell Holmes, the point of departure for law is the 
“bad man”. This is a reasonable and justified assumption, especially if one 
expects law to protect society from “bad men”, including those cheating and 
lying when entering into contracts. But legal regulation based on a 
pragmatic conception may collide with a legal order based on autonomous 
morality. The latter being a legal order envisioned by legislators who do not 
intend to protect the members of society, but rather, intend to create such 
circumstances within which a person is a human being of moral choice. 
 Promise may give rise to moral obligation if the promisor is rational, if 
he is able to render his actions universal (as demonstrated in the case of 
the promisor not willing to repay a loan). But this is regarded, even by 
Kant, not as an empirical but a normative condition: man has to be seen 
this way in order to be able to free him from his age of infancy one day. 
Knowledge, time, and information instrumental to reasonableness are 
limited. As an intellectual exercise, it is hard, costly, and—for the same 
reason—almost impossible to foresee the entire scope of an undertaking, 
to settle the risks in advance. Within certain limits, the legislator takes 
care of establishing a universal law, which contracting parties were not 
capable of, due to their intellectual or moral infancy, or hedonism. Legal 
provisions regulate some eventualities not foreseen by the promisor, in a 
manner as it is expectable from a reasonable man. (Then, the empirical 
legislator soon arrives at trade customs as depositories of universalizable 
maxims of action.) Most rules of contract law are dispositive, and that 
allows for deviations from this supposed reasonableness. In certain cases, 
the legislator’s efforts to make universal moral law into law might also mean 
including Kantian requirements therein. The legislator, playing the role of 
the Kantian man in place of contracting parties, declares that contractual 
clauses that treat other people as mere instruments are contrary to good 
morals. While a theory of law might promote morals, when following such 
laws one’s actions will be only legal, and not moral. 
 There is a further difficulty regarding intellectual capacities and charac-
teristics of everyday knowledge, which shall be remedied by law. In the 
Kantian examples, the promisor’s determination to perform is unlimited as 
much as his ability to perform is. The promisor did not only decide (and, 
thus, obliged) to pay 50 pounds, but he is able to do so. In reality, however, 
as promises are attempts to rule the future, even such a simple case is 
heavy with uncertainties that may disturb the fulfilment of a promise, or 
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may require its ex post revision. What if the 50 pound note was stolen, 
before it could have been handed over? What if by the time performance is 
due, the promisor becomes impoverished and lives on begging? What if by the 
time of performance the 50 pound note is worth nothing? The promisor's 
consciousness can not encompass such cases—law has to make up for it. 
And, especially in the case of contracts with consideration, law can not let 
the promisor determine ex post about what he wanted in the first place. May 
one insist upon a principle or a narrative of promise, will, or declaration, 
one has to hold that in law promise continues its own legal existence. 
Autonomy turns into heteronomy. What remains of freedom is submitting to 
a game by—at least from one’s perspective—arbitrary rules. To conclude, 
in contrast to the Kantian assumption, law attributes legal significance to a 
will which is not fully determined: in real life, economic and other relations 
are run upon indeterminate obligations and partial promises. There is room for 
conditional promises and options. There is engagement before marriage that 
has legal consequences in many legal systems. The factual is taken as an 
obligation, it is elevated to the status of promise. 
 Law can not handle promise as giving rise to moral obligation, for — 
as in law and in everyday life — the preconditions of autonomous promises 
are lacking. Regulations substitute these deficiencies with other assumptions. 
The first unrealised assumption is that a promise is made by a reasonable 
man, who can universalise his actions and their consequences. For this 
reason, many legal prohibitions prohibit promises. For instance, a contract is 
against good morals if it binds one party, while the performance of the other 
party depends on the occurrence of some event depending exclusively on 
his own intentions. This rule, already incorporated in the law of the European 
Communities, intends to secure universalisable promises.53 (From the 
perspective of Aristotelian ethics, such a rule might constitute a violation 
of distributive justice. One does not have to go that far, since such rules 
may also be made to protect autonomy.) 
 If the binding force of promise is explained by submitting that in a 
promise the promisor recognizes himself as an intelligent and autonomous 
being (without which one can not expect to be recognised as such), why 
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does this have such a minimal relevance in contract law? The answer lays in 
the amorality of the world, of human relations and of law. Or, to phrase it in 
an even sharper manner, in a contract one does not only make a promise 
about goods or services: when concluding a contract, one also enters into an 
agreement about his trustworthiness (fidelity) and establishes a standard of 
expectations concerning the other party. This is demonstrated in contractual 
default penalties and liquidated damages, although indemnification, unilateral 
termination, and exemption from performance (even if they typically concern 
external circumstances) may also be mentioned here. Liquidated damages 
are far the best example: in case of breach of contract by the other party, in 
exchange for proper assignment, the obligee agrees to settle for part of the 
expected benefit. Thus, the obligee gives up part of the initially expected 
performance in exchange for a secondary, more secure performance.54 
Promise is transformed in the contract. It is not promise that matters but the 
extent to which the acceptor takes it seriously: the more seriously he takes it 
on the level of facticity (see reliance), the stronger the binding force of 
promise will be—although it is all a matter of agreement. Damages are not 
adjusted to reliance generated by the promise, but to the extent to which it 
was possible to rely on the promise on the basis of the agreement, or to the 
extent the obligee did actually rely on the promise. But even this brings by a 
practical legal twist: acceptance does not justify the obligee’s unconditional 
confidence; it justifies what the court regards as acceptable according to 
trade considerations. At best, the standard is efficiency and de facto custom. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The relationship between promise as a moral category and facts treated as 
promise in law is almost accidental. If, at the outset, there was some ground 
to believe that law, and contract, should correspond with moral requirements 
of promise on an elementary level, now it seems that law is at least 
indifferent to factors that give rise to moral obligation based upon a promise. 
Perhaps it is beneficial that law was liberated from the tutelage of morals, 
as this way law was made more efficient. Nonetheless, law has become 
morally empty. Even public law references to autonomy serve the limitation 
of freedom. 
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 Law uses terms that refer to morals and legislation—at least for public 
purposes—has insisted for a long time (and perhaps even today) that it 
asserts at least a moral minimum. In fact, however, for internal use, law is 
proud that its ethically tainted terms gained predictable doctrinal content 
as seen in the case of good faith or intent. That pride is truly justified for 
arbitrariness begins with the application of dogmatically undigested terms, 
where cases are decided with reference to brute public interest. Those 
cases follow the bare logic of power, the dictates of private interests. The 
separation of law and morals was widely celebrated—and there was some-
thing emancipating in it, paradoxically in the same sense as morals were 
sought in the present analysis. When emancipated from the dictates of 
morals, law served freedom better than legal norms formulated in morally 
coloured legal systems until the 19th century. 
 Other moral critics hold law responsible for the loss of freedom, pre-
supposing that, following bourgeois revolutions, freedom was to be served 
by law. Indeed, even if law was a means of social liberation, it is to be 
received with reservations. Bourgeois revolutions—taking the French 
Declaration of 1789 seriously—promised freedom only within the framework 
of statutes: the private law of the Code Civil was freedom-loving only in 
its rhetoric. The record of classical private law in guaranteeing freedom is 
certainly remarkable, since it made possible all sorts of transactions among a 
growing number of people and even enforced these under certain conditions. 
However, freedom was of secondary importance for law, although, in respect 
to freedom (as can be experienced once again today), it is pleasing when 
public administration is bound by law. As far as private law, and contract 
law, is concerned, beyond rhetoric, it did not centre around freedom and 
autonomy. It strived for a kind of institutional or economic efficiency. 
Ethical or moral rhetoric has survived at least in part, but gradually it is 
losing its significance. According to Eörsi’s summary—that does not sound 
melancholic or resigned at all—modern law is centred around problems 
that can not be solved by axiomatic methods as society is too complicated 
for their application. “Legal system as a coherent conceptual system has 
failed, and its constituents are now independently used for part-purposes 
which are often mutually contradictory.”55 
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